Table 1 Variables used for the construction of ITTScore index
From: Measuring the capacity to combat illicit tobacco trade in 160 countries
Domains | Sub-domain | Variable | OECD | Non-OECD | LIC | LMIC | UMIC | World |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Governance | Intellectual property | Extent of intellectual property rights (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 5.4 | 4.8 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.2 |
Extent are property rights, including financial assets, protected (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 5.4 | 4.9 | 3.7 | 3.9 | 4.0 | 4.3 | ||
Corruption | Firms experiencing bribes (%) | 2.9 | 5.7 | 23.6 | 23.5 | 12.6 | 14.3 | |
Public transactions where a gift or informal payment was requested (%) | 2.1 | 4.2 | 18.4 | 19.0 | 9.8 | 11.2 | ||
Firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials (%) | 1.0 | 3.7 | 18.6 | 17.9 | 10.3 | 10.9 | ||
Firms expected to give gifts to secure government contract (%) | 7.0 | 3.5 | 36.7 | 31.8 | 20.1 | 21.0 | ||
Firms expected to give gifts to get an operating license (%) | 3.1 | 5.9 | 20.8 | 18.3 | 9.7 | 11.8 | ||
% of firms expected to give gifts to get an import license | 0.4 | 4.0 | 17.4 | 19.2 | 9.6 | 10.7 | ||
% of firms expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things done" | 7.9 | 9.6 | 30.2 | 32.7 | 13.1 | 19.2 | ||
% of firms identifying the courts system as a major constraint | 12.0 | 14.3 | 39.9 | 39.9 | 34.4 | 29.8 | ||
Rule of law | Favoritism of government officials to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 3.9 | 3.7 | 2.9 | 3.0 | 2.8 | 3.2 | |
Independence of judicial system from influences of the government, individuals, or companies (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 5.3 | 4.6 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.0 | ||
Organized crime | Extent of organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 5.6 | 5.7 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 4.7 | |
Reliability of police services (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 5.7 | 5.2 | 3.8 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 4.4 | ||
Government effectiveness | Extent of public trust in politicians (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 4.0 | 3.9 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 3.1 | |
Extent of burden of government regulation (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 3.5 | 3.9 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 3.5 | ||
Transparency of government policymaking (lowest: 1; highest: 7) | 4.9 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 4.2 | ||
Informality | Firms competing against unregistered or informal firms (%) | 28.6 | 44.9 | 61.5 | 55.4 | 50.6 | 48.5 | |
Firms identifying practices of competitors in the informal sector as a major constraint (%) | 16.2 | 21.0 | 35.4 | 32.1 | 28.1 | 27.0 | ||
Tax administration | Percent of firms identifying tax administration as a major constraint (%) | 18.5 | 14.0 | 27.8 | 25.6 | 23.0 | 22.4 | |
Tobacco control policies | Demand-related | Price of cigarette per pack (in USD) | 8.7 | 8.9 | 3.3 | 3.9 | 6.6 | 6.1 |
Tax burden of cigarette (% share of retail price) | 56.4 | 40.9 | 20.1 | 33.1 | 40.8 | 38.7 | ||
Affordability (% share of per capita income) | 2.7 | 2.0 | 18.0 | 7.6 | 4.3 | 6.8 | ||
Price dispersion Share of cheapest brand price in premium brand price (%) (the higher the % the smaller the gap) | 77.1 | 59.9 | 28.4 | 42.6 | 53.5 | 52.2 | ||
Supply restriction | Compliance to smoke free environment (lowest: 0; highest: 10) | 8.5 | 8.5 | 3.8 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 5.9 | |
Trade policies and customs practices | Trade policies and customs practices | Efficiency of customs and border management clearance (lowest: 1; highest: 5) | 3.5 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.7 |
Quality of trade and transport infrastructure (lowest: 1; highest: 5) | 3.7 | 3.1 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 2.6 | 2.7 | ||
Competence and quality of logistics services (lowest: 1; highest: 5) | 3.7 | 3.1 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 2.6 | 2.8 | ||
Ability to track and trace consignments (lowest: 1; highest: 5) | 3.8 | 3.1 | 2.4 | 2.6 | 2.7 | 2.9 |